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Harald Baldersheim
The topic of my chapter is the three great waves of local government reforms
in European countries over the last 25 years or so. I present some lessons from
three broad, paradigmatic cases: the reform waves that started with the That-
cher years in the UK, the Scandinavian free commune experiments, and the
post-communist decentralisation reforms. I then add some comments onwhat
may become future directions for reform driven by digitalisation of local go-
vernance. The common denominator for the three waves of reformwas the aim
of enhancing the responsiveness of local government to citizens’ concerns. Theme-
thods of working towards that goal were quite different, however. I do not delve
deeply into how these reforms unfolded in individual countries1. My purpose
is to develop a conceptual model for deconstructing reform processes with the
aim of understanding the change mechanisms of reforms in particular.
I wish to distinguish reforms from minor adjustments of structures and
procedures that occur frequently in most political–administrative systems, for
example, as ad hoc responses to environmental pressures in one or more mu-
nicipalities or ministerial initiatives with regard to one pet project or another.
Reforms refer to intentional, planned overhauls of major components of the
politico–administrative systems.
My discussion of the reforms is guided by five questions: Why did the re-
forms happen: what were the triggers that provided the political energy? Who
were the actors – the change coalitions - that drove the reforms? How was the
reform to occur: what was the change theory built into the reform?Wherewere
the reforms heading: what were the values and visions that guided the reforms?
And what were the new problems engendered, in turn’, by the reforms, that pos-
sibly gave birth to new reforms?
The questions and an outline of the answers are indicated in table 1.
1. For compact analyses of local government reforms in individual European countries, cf.
for example Kersting and Vetter 2003, Denters and Rose 2005 or Lidstöm et al. 2011.
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Triggers and reform coalitions
Reformmovements may be infused with energy from a variety of sources. The
source is frequently a more or less widespread feeling of failure or grievance;
the feeling may be grounded in objective reality or may be founded on ideolo-
gically based convictions. In the case of the British reforms of the early 1980s,
the ideological element was pronounced — the Conservatives were convinced
that the «lunatic left» had hijacked many local authorities to pursue wild poli-
cies of indoctrination of the young or were too responsive to special minorities
and not sensitive enough to the majority’s needs (Sullivan 2003). In retrospect,
even Labourites have acknowledged that trade unions had too much say in lo-
cal governments, resulting in inefficient practices and overspending (Stoker
2004). The reform coalition was, at the outset, a determined group of Conser-
vatives with a grip on the commanding heights of government after the Con-
servative election victory of 1979, against largely Labour-dominated local
authorities that resisted the proposed changes.
In the Scandinavian case, the energy came from local government grievan-
ces over central government interference in local decision making (Balders-
heim & Ståhlberg 1994). Municipalities felt that local autonomy was being
severely restricted by detailed national legislation, earmarked grants and un-
funded mandates as the municipalities in the post-war period had developed
into important bodies of implementation for the welfare state. Local govern-
ment spokesmen argued that if they were givenmore room for local discretion,
it would be easier to find solutions that were well adapted to local conditions;
Table 1: Local government reform programmes: three cases
UK reforms under 
Thatcher
Scandinavian free 
commune experi-
ments
Post-communist
decentralisation 
Why: triggers Inefficiency Decline of autonomy Regime collapse
Who: reform coali-
tions
Dominant party Central-local part-
nerships
Emergent elites
How: change theory Choice, competition Experiments Remodelling, shock 
therapy
Whence: values Efficiency Autonomy Democracy
Where: visions Liberal Republican Communitarian
Terminal: new pro-
blems
Institutional frag-
mentation
Overload Territorial fragmenta-
tion
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thus local services would not only be better attuned to local demands, they
might be cheaper too, since more local discretion would mean national stan-
dards could be relaxed. The latter part of the argument was especially attractive
to central governments who were worried about the soaring local expenditu-
res. The free commune experiments that were initiated in response to the pro-
blems identified were largely partnership ventures between central and local
governments. Initiated in Sweden in 1984, national parliaments enacted enab-
ling legislation that empowered selected municipalities to dispense with stan-
dard national regulations in various fields to introduce their own alternative
arrangements for a limited period. The idea of free commune experiments
spread rapidly from Sweden to the other Nordic countries2. Most fields of pu-
blic responsibility were affected by these initiatives — from school regulations
to forest management. In many cases the new arrangements amounted to a lo-
cal takeover of state functions. Although the change coalition took the form of
central – local partnerships, with national authorities providing the necessary
legal leeway and political support for the general idea, individual ministries
and subordinate agencies in some cases proved reluctant to actually give up
established controls, so that some issues had to be resolved at cabinet level.
In East-Central Europe, the immediate reform impetus came from the ne-
cessity of filling the institutional gaps that arose in 1989 in the wake of the col-
lapse of the communist regimes and their discredited institutions of
government. In some cases, there had been some time for the preparation of
new local institutions ahead of the disappearance of the communists, especial-
ly in Hungary where the transition was rather stepwise, and also in Poland
where the «round table» negotiations between Solidarity and the communists
included drafts for new local government legislation (Baldersheim et al. 1996;
Swianiewicz 2003). The change in Czechoslovakia and also in the countries
further east was much more abrupt, so that local government reforms had to
start from scratch and only after the communists had stepped down. Even
where some preparation had been possible, only general outlines were drafted,
and important details had to be filled in after the institutions had been estab-
lished on the ground, for example, regarding finances andmunicipal property.
Many developments and problems in later stages of institution-building are
understandable in the light of the initial chaos of transition (observers remar-
ked, for example, on the challenges of the triple transitions that had to be un-
dertaken: establishing democracy, market economy and civil society all at
once; Illner 2003). The reform coalitions driving the changes were the emer-
gent new elites that replaced the communists. Naturally, the new brooms had
2. Interestingly, France picked up the free commune idea in the decentralisation reforms
that started under the Raffarin government 2003 – 2005 (Cole 2006).
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little previous experience in government; this was so both at the national and
local levels (Surazska 1997). Implementation of the reforms, therefore, to some
extent took on the character of a trial-and-error process; this was also in part
due to the many loose ends that had still not been tied up when the new insti-
tutions had to start functioning after the first round of local elections of 1990.
Change theories
How was change to be achieved? How were reforms made to work? What was
the change theory that guided the reforms? I do not assume that the reforms
were built on or drew on theories by any scientific meaning of the word. Still,
all reforms seek to achieve change in one way or another. Through what kinds
of action or series of actions is change to be achieved? This question is what
evaluation studies refer to as programme theory, that is, the built-in ideas about
action sequences that are expected to lead from goals to results (Bickmann
1987; Dahler-Larsen 2001).
The change mechanisms demonstrated by the waves of reform indicated
earlier — the Thatcher initiatives, the free communes, and the post-commu-
nist revolutions — are those of choice & competition, experiments & selection,
and remodelling & shock therapy respectively. I do not claim that these mecha-
nisms exhaust the list of potential change-drivers in public institutions; a more
complete list might include, for example, cohort shifts (new people replacing
old cadres), technological factors, cultural clashes, financial crises, coalition
shifts, and environmental changes. What I claim is that the three former types
have been essential in bringing about (some measure of) change in the well-
publicised reforms just mentioned and are therefore worth looking at more
closely.
The Conservative reforms in the UK started out with efforts to curb local
spending by first reducing the revenue basis of local government (removing the
business tax) and then by more stringently controlling the levels of spending
(Sullivan 2003; Stoker 2004). Gradually, the focus shifted to establishing a
more consumer-responsive government. This was to be achieved by «giving
the public choices, or by instituting mechanisms which build in publicly-ap-
proved standards, and redress when they are not attained», according to one of
the ministers of the Thatcher government (Waldgrave 1993; quoted from Sto-
ker 2004: 28). A distinction was made between «purchasers» and «providers»;
the former acted as agents on behalf of the elected bodies, and the latter were
the producers who deliver the services; the purchasers were to buy services
from whoever could give the principals the best value for money, be it private
or public producers. To emphasise the point, legislation was introduced to en-
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sure compulsory, competitive tendering for public purchases. A second move
was to transfer a number of functions from local authorities to single-purpose
agencies (quangos) for their discharge (in education, public transport, econo-
mic development initiatives, etc). The overall aim was to institute mechanisms
that would work as countervailing forces to what was seen as producer-domi-
nance in local government service provision. These included the competitive
tendering just mentioned, and further, more direct user control over the vari-
ous single-purpose bodies, performancemeasures made available to the public
(to guide user choices and to put pressure on producers) and a series of regu-
latory and supervisory bodies with powers to challenge local producers on be-
half of users. These changes again set in motion the managerial revolution
often referred to as New Public Management (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000; Øgård
2005), the general features of which were devolution of authority and accoun-
tability to cost centres that were encouraged to think and act more like private
firms, cost-conscious and consumer-oriented. The range of new choice and
managerial measures introduced was probably demonstrated at its fullest by
Braintree District Council and the London Borough ofWestminster, although
the level of enthusiasm for the new thinking varied even among councils con-
trolled by the conservatives (Holliday 2000). Overall, user satisfaction with ser-
vice provision improved over the ten-year period from the mid-eighties to the
mid-nineties (Stoker 2004: 38). Much of the Conservative legacy in local go-
vernment was retained by the successive Labour governments, although cer-
tain modifications were introduced and a supplementary reform agenda
outlined (Stoker 2004).
The central change mechanism of the Nordic free commune programmes
was that of experimental selection of demonstrator projects. The administrative
experiment was the key mechanism on which the programmes hinged. The
core idea was that of the experiment as a learning cycle (cf fig. 1). The basics of
the process may be outlined in the following manner (Baldersheim & Fimreite
1996): The central government invited local authorities to submit applications
regarding regulations from which they would like to be exempted; as a part of
their applications, the local authorities also outlined the alternative arrange-
ments they would like to carry out. The outcome was a series of local initiatives
for the central government to consider (in practice, through a secretariat loca-
ted in the respective ministries for local government). Selection of initiatives
was carried out by the secretariat according to criteria stipulated in the enab-
ling legislation that established the programmes; the selection was approved by
the relevant ministry (and in some countries also by Parliament).
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Fig. 1: Free commune experiments as a learning cycle (Source: Baldersheim & Fimreite 1994).
In many cases, selection of experimental projects meant lengthy negotiations
between the municipality in question and the central agency responsible for a
particular field of government operations; this was especially the case when the
project implied a local takeover of a national function. In the majority of cases,
however, the selection process went fairly smoothly.
Implementation of approved projects was not always a straightforward mat-
ter, either. Running the project could bemore complicated than anticipated. Tra-
de unions at the local level could represent one obstacle, for example. Some
projects never got off the ground, but they were not numerous. In Norway, the
implementation rate was close to 90 percent. The final step was the evaluation of
project results. Did the experimental projects lead to the anticipated results?Was
the suggested alternative a good one? Could it be made into a general reform to
apply to all municipalities? Some countries had established formal evaluation
programmes along with the experimental programmes, with research institu-
tions charged with observing and collecting data on the experiments as they un-
folded; this was particularly so in Norway. In other countries, evaluation took
place in-house, in the ministry responsible for local government affairs.
The overall end result of the free commune experiments was not primarily
a series of specific reforms that imposed new institutional patterns on local go-
vernment as a whole. Instead, numerous national regulations were relaxed,
granting local governments more freedom to decide for themselves how to run
their affairs. Interestingly, all four countries enacted new local government le-
gislation in the early 1990s, with much greater leeway for municipalities with
regard to institutional choice. Specific legislation, for example, for education,
was overhauled in a similar spirit, removing stipulations that were thought too
restrictive by municipalities. The lasting legacy of the free commune program-
mes was an enhancement of local autonomy, not a specific type of reform.
When I suggest that remodelling with an element of shock therapy was a con-
spicuous change mechanism in the post-communist reforms, I wish to empha-
sise that the reform programmes consisted of more than a mere passive copying
of blueprints or wholesale transfers of institutional packages from abroad; insti-
tution-building certainly also included elements of «enactment» (Fountain
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2001) and problem-solving— creative processes of adaptation. There is enough
variation across countries to demonstrate that independent institutional engi-
neering took place in all countries. However, a consistent theme of reform pro-
grammes was what has been termed a «rectifying» orientation – a desire to
«return» to «normalcy», to become a «normal» country (Illner 2003; Swianie-
wicz 2002). The standards of normalcy were what the new elites took to be the
basic elements of democracy and the market economy as they observed them in
Western Europe. In contrast to theNordic free commune experiments, the infor-
mal slogan that guided post-communist reforms seemed to be that of «No expe-
riments, please!» On a personal note, I remember vividly from my first visit to
Bratislava in June 1990 the banners that decorated the city centre, proclaiming
«Back to Europe!» And as local democracy was seen as a vital element of a de-
mocratic order, democratic decentralisationwas put on the earliest reform agen-
das. Elected councils, accountable local administrations and an independent
financial basis for local decisionmaking were introduced within little more than
a year after the communist debacle.Many aspects of the reformswere incomplete
and some elements took a decade to be put in place (e. g., a democratic regional
government or coherent financial systems). Local autonomy was also rather li-
mited in some of these countries; the mindset of centralisation took a long time
to die (if it ever did). The subsequent drive to join the European Union meant
that even more pressure to harmonise institutional patterns with «normal» Eu-
ropean standards was brought to bear on institutional development. For exam-
ple, in Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia, it took the pressure of the EU
requirement of democratically elected regional governments as a precondition
for membership to reach national agreement on the shape of the regional level
(Baldersheim & Malíkóva 2011). The Council of Europe through its Charter of
Local Government and the bodies of foreign assistance such as the British Know-
How Fund were further sources of institutional models with an impact on the
design of local government in post-communist countries. Furthermore, mayors
and other local government personnel were often eager to go on study tours to
West European countries (Baldersheim et al. 2002). In some cases, remodelling
alsomeant returning to patterns from the nation’s past, such as, for example, the
tradition of dual functions, delegated and independent tasks, dating back to the
Habsburg era (Illner 2003). Imitation is not the whole story, of course; other ty-
pes of causality have also to be considered to explain the whole range of variation
in terms of institution-building — variations in transitional circumstances, le-
vels of economic development, political cultures, etc. (Illner 2003). However, my
main point here is not discussing the whole range of possible explanations of va-
riations in post-communist decentralisation reforms. I focus on remodelling as
a typical change mechanism in these reforms, not necessarily the only one.
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However, the introduction of new institutional models was accompanied
(to varying extents) by cultural shock. The newness of the post-communist or-
der caused considerable disorientation among actors at the local level (Surasz-
ka 1996). To work this into a model of change, I have found it useful to divide
the post-communist local reform processes into three stages (Baldersheim
2003): translation, naturalisation and normalisation. The focus in the respec-
tive stages is on rules, roles and habits. In the first stage, the rules, the legal fo-
undation of the institution is worked out, with a script from a foreign model
inmind; even if there is an element of copying, the rules have to be worked into
a different national context and sometimes a different political culture. In the
second stage, naturalisation, as disorientation wears off, actors have to learn to
apply the rules and learn the roles, the bundles of behavioural norms that make
up the institutional order – what is the role of the mayor, the councillor, the
chief executive, and so on? There may be room for creativity in role interpreta-
tion, especially at the early stages of institution-building — mayors may per-
form their roles quite differently, even with reference to the same rule book. In
this stage, the institutions begin to take on a local colouring and are accepted
as one’s own. Normalisation means habituation, when roles and rules become
«habits of the heart» in de Tockeville’s expression (Bellah et al. 1985), which
means that institutions become «infused with value» (Selznick 1957). At this
stage, change has become institutionalised, that is, embedded in actors’ value
systems. This may be necessary for the smooth functioning of public adminis-
tration. Paradoxically, when institutions become value-laden, they also beco-
me resistant to change for that very reason (March & Olsen 1989). Of course,
institution-building may not necessarily reach this stage, in which case institu-
tions remain unstable. Russia is a case in point. Decentralisation reforms have
proven extremely difficult to carry out; this is not for lack of initiatives— there
have been several attempts, but they have been contradictory or half-hearted,
either ill-designed or backed up by weak change coalitions, so they have hardly
passed through the early stages of implementation, and certainly not normali-
sation (Wollmann & Butusova 2003). The vicissitudes of the decentralisation
reforms in Russia may also reflect more divided attitudes towards theWest Eu-
ropean «model countries», dampening the modelling urge. A similar fate also
befell decentralisation reforms in some of the Balkan countries during the
1990s (cf. e. g. Kopric 2003 on Croatia).
Values
The normative foundation of local government includes the values of local auto-
nomy (freedom from state interference), democracy (scope for citizen participa-
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tion and influence) and efficiency (making the most of available resources)
(Sharpe 1970).Where these values are cherished, local government is the answer
to institution-builders. Individual reforms do not necessarily emphasise all three
core values in equal measure. One value may be pursued more vigorously than
the others, depending on what the change coalition sees as the overarching pro-
blems to be solved. The value orientation of reformers also reveals what they see
as the most urgent legitimacy problem of local government at a particular mo-
ment. There could be little doubt that the UK reformers saw efficiency as a pres-
sing issue and sought to put in place new institutions and procedures that would
enhance efficiency, in terms of both value for money and better responsiveness
to consumer preferences (external efficiency). Choice and competition were to
be the answers to efficiency problems. The lack of efficiency threatened the legi-
timacy of local government in the long run. That the cure may have threatened
it even more is a different matter, to which I shall return.
The free commune experiments were concerned, above all, with local auto-
nomy. As pointed out earlier, the constraining impacts of successive, ill-coor-
dinated central government initiatives on behalf of local government had left
municipalities with less and less room for manoeuvre, in the view of local lea-
ders, while the expectations of citizens were mounting. Enhancement of local
democracy and effectiveness would come as a result of widening autonomy, the
argument ran, so more autonomy was the basic prerequisite, including more
local influence over (previous) state functions. Central governments respon-
ded to the free commune programmes as steps towards more local flexibility
and discretion in decision making (the contrast to the Thatcher programme
was striking; the British medicine meant curbing local autonomy and depri-
ving municipalities of functions).
In the post-communist transformations, considerations regarding local de-
mocracy took precedence. Such a priority was not surprising:With the memo-
ries of communist autocracy fresh in everyone’s mind, the new elites needed to
demonstrate regime change in a palpablemanner. Preparing the ground for lo-
cal elections was also seen as an urgency in order to avoid an entrenchment of
«old structures» (a euphemism for old communists) at the local level. (In the
local elections of 1990 in East-Central Europe, 60–70 percent of the councillors
elected were new brooms, without previous experience in local government. In
elections to the post of mayor, however, more experienced people were chosen
— 65 percent of Slovak mayors had previous experience, for example; Offerdal
et al. 1996). Other expressions of concern about the state of democracy were
the institutions of direct democracy and the series of checks on the local exe-
cutive powers instituted in many countries, viz. citizen initiatives, referenda
and recall of mayors (where there was a direct mayoral election, as in Slovakia).
Participation in local elections was high at the outset in many countries, for
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example, a 75 percent turnout in the Czech Republic in 1990 and the same level
in the new German Länder in the same year. Turnout was substantially lower
in Hungary and Poland, however (39 and 42 percent). In most post-commu-
nist countries, participation in local elections has fallen since the early eupho-
ric days of reform, hovering at the same level as that in many West European
countries – another sign of «normalisation», perhaps.
Visions
I argue that the reforms under analysis flow from overarching political visions
and value sets that might possibly be termed reform philosophies, although
pragmatism was also very much in evidence among reformers. It is, however,
not so difficult to identify the core elements of a liberal philosophy in the That-
cher reforms: an emphasis on individual freedom and choice, a distrust of bu-
reaucracy and collective arrangements, a belief in the market, etc. Many of the
components of reforms make sense when interpreted in the light of such ori-
entations. The retention of large-scale local government units (the largest in
Europe) may seem less compatible with the liberal philosophy (John 2010) as
New Right analysts have often pointed out the advantages of a small scale in
terms of adaptive capacities (Ostrom 1973).
The Scandinavian concern regarding enhancement of local autonomy
through free commune experiments was intended to make more room for lo-
cal decision making, that is, giving the elected bodies and their leaders more
say over local agendas and priorities. Consequently, local politics and leaders-
hip would come more to the forefront. This again was expected to lead to a
clarification of political responsibility in the eyes of the voters and, hence, an
improvement of accountability. While the UK reforms emphasised the busi-
nesslike features of local government, the Scandinavians highlighted the poli-
tical nature of local governance. The latter reform, therefore, implicitly
suggests a republican philosophy with an emphasis on the primacy of politics
and leadership as formative forces for local citizenship and community de-
velopment. The (initially surprising) local interest in taking over state func-
tions further underlined the willingness to subject more public functions to
local political accountability. The ideal reflected in the totality of the experi-
mental projects was that of the integrated, multi-functional municipality un-
der democratic control.
The collapse of communist regimes with their institutions and value sys-
tems created a disorientation in segments of the population. Trust was not au-
tomatically extended to the new institutions. The quest for identity sought
more primordial foci, such as family, locality, region, or circles of friends, a de-
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velopment that has been characterised as a spread of communitarian orienta-
tions (Illner 2003) or identity quests through roots. A communitarian ethos
also had some impact on the decentralisation reforms, if not by design, at least
by default, triggering moves to dismantle previously amalgamated local units.
In the Czech Republic, the number of municipalities rose by almost 40 percent
to more than 6.000. The number doubled in Hungary (to 3.313), while the in-
crease was around 26 percent in Slovakia and 12 percent in Croatia (it remai-
ned unchanged in other countries, however, such as Poland or Latvia). In some
countries, regionalist parties had some initial electoral success (the Moravian
party in the Czech Republic, for instance; Clark & Swianiewicz 1996).
New problems
Reforms aim at solving problems, and may do so, but they may also engender
new problems that have to be faced by a new generation of reformers. One of
the legacies of the Thatcher reforms was fragmentation of local governance. A
multitude of semi-independent, single-purpose agencies was created to facili-
tate efficient service production, and a range of regulatory bodies was establis-
hed to ensure compliance with citizen-friendly standards. The sum of these
creations was fragmented structures of community decision making. Coordi-
nating these institutions in a community development perspective was the
challenge faced by the labour reformers (Stoker 2004). Joined-up government
was launched as the answer. Theoretically, notions of governance — non-hie-
rarchical decision-making — and multi-level governance came to the fore in
UK research on local politics (e. g., Pierre & Peters 2000), no doubt in response
to the need to grasp a more institutionally fragmented local scene.
The free commune experiments did result in extension of autonomy and,
consequently, new responsibilities for local governments. What municipalities
discovered further down the road, however, was that the available resources did
not always match the new responsibilities. Local authorities complained about
insufficient funding relative to the tasks for which they were responsible. The
response of central governments was to start examining the structure of local
government — were there too many small municipalities with inadequate
resource bases and lack of qualified personnel? The Danish government in
2007 radically reduced the number of municipalities to 98 (down from 270)
and went on to abolish the county councils (Mouritzen 2010). A Norwegian
minister for local government affairs announced that she would like to reduce
the number of municipalities by at least 100, to make them more viable (ho-
wever, the subsequent red-green coalition put structural reforms on hold). The
Swedish government appointed a commission to examine the sustainability of
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the existing local government order; the small print of the commission’s man-
date was a question mark over the smallest municipalities. Interestingly, the
proposed structural changes were proclaimed in defence of local autonomy,
understood as a (better) capacity for service provision (Lidström 2010).
In terms of local government structure, the post-communist reform legacy
was, in a number of countries, territorial fragmentation. Numerous tiny mu-
nicipalities emerged from splitting of previous amalgamations, as pointed out
earlier. After the reforms, the average number of inhabitants inHungarianmu-
nicipalities, for example, was around 1300. The small-scale character of local
government proved to be an obstacle to further decentralisation as the majori-
ty of municipalities were deemed too small and weak to take over tasks that
might be a natural local responsibility, such as primary education. So the
success of the initial wave of decentralisation and democratisation became an
excuse for retaining central control. Local autonomy remains limited in many
post-communist countries (Illner 2010).
General lessons
The three reforms sought to deal with largely the same underlying problem:
how to create more responsive local governments. Diagnoses and cures varied:
complaints over a predominance of producer interests in the Thatcher case, too
much central government interference in the Scandinavian case, and a year-
ning for local democracy and proximity in the post-communist case. The three
waves of reform demonstrated that future reformers have several reform «mo-
dels» to choose from.
All three cases have interesting potential for institutional learning. The free
commune experiments have already been spelt out as learning cycles. Choice and
competition and remodelling can also be analysed as learning processes. Service
providers may learn from the choice of consumers and improve their acts if ne-
cessary. The political masters may also learn from information about consumer
choices (or synthetically from user surveys or other performance indicators).
And the citizen may learn about the service providers if given the right informa-
tion, and so on.Development and application of performance indicators have al-
most become industries in their own right (Kuhlmann et al. 2004).
However, can remodelling and shock therapy be called learning in a ratio-
nal sense? A common definition of organisational learning emphasises the ex-
periential component of learning processes: the capability to change behaviour
on the basis of information about consequences of previous decisions (March
& Olsen 1976). Organisational change means changing or correcting routines
(Levitt & March 1988). The informational basis for change may, however, also
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include the experiences of other organisations. Organisations may learn from
each other. The example of others may also provide valuable clues for change.
How valuable the examples are depends on the quality of the information av-
ailable about those experiences.
To fully understand the learning cycles of reforms in local government, le-
arning processes across borders must be taken into account (Baldersheim et al.
2002). All the three waves of reform discussed here had an impressive border-
crossing capacity. The market-oriented reforms initiated during the Thatcher
period travelled widely under the label of New Public Management. The free
commune experiments spread rapidly among the Nordic countries, and, as
mentioned before, were picked up as a reform model by France in 2003 under
the Raffarin government. And, as I have argued, post-communist decentralisa-
tion was conceived and implemented with the eyes of the reformers fixed very
much upon model countries in Western Europe.
John Loughlin emphasises European integration as the principal driver of
the new border-crossing framework of regional and municipal exchanges,
which he interprets as harbingers of far-reaching shifts of the political order of
the nation-states: «Previously, the nation-state was the framework within
which solutions were sought and national governments the principal actors
that would supply these solutions. This was the old centre-periphery fram-
ework…. Since then (the 1980s), both the framework and the role of national
actors have changed» (Loughlin 2001: 387–388).
To understand the dynamics of the new framework, the concept of learning
ecologies is useful (Baldersheim &Øgård 2011). In an effective cross-border le-
arning regime, three groups of actors often come together: local champions of
change in search of solutions to local problems, knowledge brokers with (ho-
pefully) relevant expertise, and national gate-keepers whose permission may
be necessary for exchanges to take place between local champions and know-
ledge brokers, especially if the latter are non-nationals. The most vital resource
of the learning process is themotivation of the local champions, without which
the reform process will quickly founder. The gatekeepers can rarely create local
motivation and they may also easily stifle it; they may, however, in a well-run
process, stimulate and nurture it. Knowledge brokers should be regarded as
providers of propositions to local champions, not solutions, as the champions
will usually adapt and amend whatever is offered so that the final outcome at
the local level will rarely be an exact copy of whatever was suggested or agreed
to at the outset. Such an outcome should not necessarily be treated as a failure
but rather as an indication of creative adaptation, as suggested by theories of
«bottom-up» implementation (Offerdal 2005).
However, Loughlin’s emphasis on European integration as the prime driver
of the new learning frameworkmay be too restrictive to fully capture the forces
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at work in shaping patterns of reform in today’s world; in my opinion, new
technologies should be added to the list of change drivers, making for global le-
arning processes.
ICTs as the new major change driver: implications for
cross-border learning
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the on-going fusion of digital infor-
mation, sound and pictures, known as information & communication techno-
logies (ICTs), is changing the face of public administration, including local
government (Dunleavy et al. 2006). Instant information and 24-hour service
provision is spreading, at least as an ideal, if not always as a reality. A 24-hour
democracy is emerging. An American company peddling systems solutions for
internet voting recently coined the slogan «Vote in your underwear!» (Kersting
& Baldersheim 2004). ICTs have been hailed as providing opportunities for vi-
talising representative democracy with a potential for direct democracy; others
see virtual politics as a debasement of democracy (Buchstein 2004). Neverthe-
less, local authorities are undoubtedly making use of ICTs as they see fit, to en-
hance both service provision and local democracy. In electronically advanced
cities, «the virtual town hall» may already include online service delivery as
well as online elections and instant, online community consultations (Balders-
heim et al. 2008; Baldersheim & Kersting 2012).
Whether this will lead to more enlightened citizens or just more impatient
consumers remains to be seen. What is beyond doubt is that ICTs in general
and the Internet in particular make more information available more quickly
to citizens and reformers alike. This again is going to speed up reform proces-
ses.We are going to seemore change in local government in the future, not less.
This also means that we are going to see more cross-border learning as it beco-
mes easier and easier for local authorities to keep abreast of what is happening
elsewhere. We are already witnessing the emergence of self-organised learning
communities of municipalities on the net; these are municipalities facing si-
milar challenges, trying out solutions in real time and sharing results instantly
over the net (Askim et al. 2008). Some of these networks are organised by the
gatekeepers, but the net offers opportunities for bypassing the national gate-
keepers. In the future, gatekeepers are likely to become more marginalised in
cross-border learning regimes while champions and knowledge brokers beco-
me the drivers of change. One implication of this trend is that national gover-
nance of the development of local government will have to change — towards
more collaboration and guidance and less steering and control.
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